This paper offers a (possibly) new interpretation of the connection between openness and good governance with a conceptual model and some empirical evidence. Assuming that corruption and bad governance drive out international trade and investment more than domestic trade and investment, the model suggests that a "naturally more open economy"-as determined by its size and geography-would devote more resources to building good institutions and would display lower corruption in equilibrium. In the data,
Introduction
The quality of government and level of bureaucratic corruption vary widely across countries. Several authors have documented that more open countries tend to have a lower level of corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Treisman, 1998; .
One could imagine that the direction of causality can go either way: greater competition induced by greater openness helps to reduce corruption; and corrupt bureaucrats like to set up trade barriers to extract bribes, reducing openness as a consequence. This paper offers a new interpretation of the connection between openness and corruption. It argues that a country's "natural openness", as determined by its geography and size, affects a country's incentive in investing in corruption-fighting public governance infrastructure. The central intuition is as follows. The amount of resources that a society devotes to building good institutions is endogenous; and depends on marginal cost and marginal benefits comparison. Since international traders and investors are more footloose (i.e., have better outside options) than domestic ones, bad governance and bureaucratic corruption in a country reduces international trade and investment more than domestic trade and investment.
1 A country that is naturally more open -as determined by its size, geography and other factors -would find it optimal to devote more resources to building good institutions. In equilibrium, such economies may display less corruption and a higher quality of government than naturally less open economies.
In the next section, I offer a simple model that formalizes this story. As extensions, I discuss how average income, income inequality and ethno-linguistic fragmentation in a country may also affect the equilibrium level of corruption.
We examine two different types of indicators of government quality. The first is an indicator of the output of public governance, namely the level of bureaucratic corruption. The second is an indicator of an input of public governance, namely, public 1 Wei (2000) concludes that foreign investors are very averse to corruption: a rise in corruption from a level that prevails in Singapore (i.e., low) to a level that prevails in Mexico (i.e., high) has the same negative effect on inward foreign direct investment as raising the marginal tax rate by fifty percentage points! Tamirisa and Wei (2000) show that corruption also deters international trade significantly. That is, corruption acts more like a non-tariff barrier than as a lubricant to international trade.
sector salaries relative to their private sector alternatives. I show that a measure of 'natural openness' based on countries' size, geography and linguistics, is a significant explanatory variable for the different levels of corruption across countries. 'Residual openness' i.e., the difference between the trade-to-GDP ratio and the "natural openness"
-which potentially includes trade policiesis often not significant statistically once 'natural openness' is accounted for. Higher average income is also associated with lower corruption.
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) reported evidence that a country with a higher public sector salary (relative to their private sector opportunity) tends to have lower corruption. Here, we show that in the data, a naturally more open economy tends to pay a better relative salary to its civil servants (even after controlling for the level of development of the country). These patterns are consistent with our theoretical story.
Section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
A Simple Theory
We provide a minimalist model that formalizes the idea discussed above.
Benchmark Model

Structure of the world
There are two countries, a "Home" country, H, and "the rest of the world," W. Both countries are in the shape of a sphere where people are uniformly distributed. There are n people in "Home" and m people in the "rest of the world." The radiuses of the two spheres are r/2 and R/2, respectively. In the middle of each country, there is a "hub."
Within country "home", trade between any two persons must go through the hub. Thus, the distance between any two persons within country H is r. For any person in Country H to trade with another person in Country W, they have to go through their respective hubs.
Assuming the distance between the two hubs are D-r/2-R/2, then the distance between domestic and foreign residents is always D. See Figure 1 .
Setup of the model
There are two periods. In period one, people in Country H decide how much to invest to build good public institutions (that would reduce the incidence of bureaucratic corruption). In period zero, people are randomly matched into pairs to realize joint production. The matching can take place either between two people from the same country or from different countries.
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Consider a representative agent j in Country H. Use k to index the partner with whom j is randomly matched, and denote the distance between j and k by D j (k).
The ratio of the two distances, D/r, measures the relative remoteness of country "Home" from the rest of the world market, which is one aspect of "natural openness."
In period one, the expected utility for agent j is
where t j is the amount of tax j has to pay in period one to build up public institutions, and Y is output. Without loss of generality, we assume no discounting.
The output level from the random matching depends on who the joint venture partner is
where x is an exogenous level output from the joint venture if there were no corruption, C h = the level of corruption in Country H, and θ > 0 indicating that a given level of corruption has a larger negative impact on international production/trade than domestic production/trade. This is a representation of the idea that corruption reduces international 2 Without random matching, an alternative but more complicated specification would be to let everyone (domestic and foreign) have a utility function over differentiated goods but be endowed with one good, and business more than domestic business. One way to think of this is through a bargaining framework. Because international investors/traders have better outsider options (they can choose to do business in a different country), domestic agent j has to concede a bigger share of the output to an international partner than a domestic one, and be content with a smaller share for herself. An alternative way to justify this is through a story of costly contract enforcement. There is more "trust" between two domestic partners than between an international and a domestic partner, possibly because other informal, cultural, tribal institutions exist for the former but not for the latter. Business transactions involving international partners involves more costly contracting than those with domestic partners.
Let P( k ∈ W ) denote the probability that j would be matched with someone from the world market, and recall that n/m is the population size of country "Home" relative to the rest of the world. We assume that
with f 1 < 0 and f 2 < 0. In other words, a country that is far away from the rest of the world, or one that has a relatively large domestic market, is less likely to engage in international economic activities. P( k ∋ W ) describes the opportunity for residents in Country H to interact with international traders/investors, which will turn out to be a key to our results.
We label P( k ∈W ) or f(.) as an index of "natural openness" for the country in question.
Of course, the probability that people in country "home" trade with other people in the same country is just the complement of the "natural openness": P( k∈H ) = 1 -P( k∈W).
Therefore, the expected utility in Period two for representative agent j is just expected output minus tax: C h = C(t) where C' < 0 and C" > 0.
In period one, representative agent j chooses an optimal amount of investment t j to devote to public institution building in order to maximize her expected utility.
The first order condition of this maximization problem is
Given the convexity of the C(t) function, it is easy to verify that the second order condition is satisfied.
This defines an implicit function for optimal amount of tax the representative
Proposition 1: Optimal tax, t, (or equilibrium corruption, C) is an increasing (or a decreasing) function of natural openness, f.
Proof: By totally differentiating the first order condition and re-arranging the terms, we obtain
Making use of the assumption on the corruption-control equation, C = C(t), we have
Hence, naturally more open economies find it optimal to devote more resources in building public institutions to fight corruption. This would translate into a lower level of corruption in equilibrium.
Extensions: Heterogeneity and Political Economy
So far, we have assumed that everyone in the country is identical. Here, we explore some implications of heterogeneity among people for public institution building.
We assume that the resources devoted to fighting corruption are determined by majority voting. We keep heterogeneity in one-dimension so that median voter decides the outcome of the voting. We assume further that the actual tax rate is the same across all individuals (even though the desired level of tax could be different).
Suppose now that the output level for agent j in country "Home" (from the random matching production process) depends on individual characteristics of j as well as on who the joint venture partner is.
where z(j) is some positive parameter.
In other words, relative to the benchmark model, we now let income, x(j), the effect of corruption on output, z(j), and the extra effect of corruption on international transactions, θ(j), to be indexed by j.
The rest of the model is unchanged. To find out individual j's desired level of tax (to be used to build public institutions), she still solves the same optimization as before, namely, choose t(j) in order to maximize
, is given by the implicit function implied by the first order condition:
It is easy to verify the following proposition by totally differentiating the first order condition.
Proposition 2:
(i) The desired level of tax by j increases with "natural openness";
(ii) The desired tax increases with the elasticity of output loss due to corruption;
(iii) The desired tax increases with the extra effect of corruption on international transactions, θ(j);
When agents are heterogeneous, the tax level desired by different agents are also different. In particular, the equilibrium tax desired by the median voter (which decides the political outcome) may be different from what is desired by the average voter (which maximizes the social welfare function that assigns equal weights to everyone). The implications of the extended model can be illustrated with three examples.
Example 1: Higher average income leads to lower corruption.
The first example is almost trivial and involves no heterogeneity at all. Let θ(j) = θ, and z(j) = x. In other words, everyone is the same as everyone else. Since the median voter is the same as the average voter, her choice trivially also maximizes the social welfare. The only difference between this example and the benchmark model is that the effect of corruption now depends on the level of income, which is an additional assumption.
By item (ii) in Proposition 2, we have dt(j)/dx > 0. Thus, as the average income level rises, the desired level of resources for public institutions also rises, leading to a lower level of corruption. This example is a near tautology, but serves as a stepping stone to the next example.
Example 2: Income inequality.
In this example, people are different only in terms of their level of income.
Suppose further that z(j) = x(j) [and θ(j) = θ, the same for all j's.].
Income distribution can take many different forms. In principle, median income can be either greater or smaller than average income. However, a typical case of income inequality is one in which median income is below the average (e.g., a few rich people plus a mass of poor people). In this case we can use the difference between average and median incomes as a way to measure income inequality.
Holding average income constant, the greater the inequality, the lower is the median income. By Proposition 2, item (ii), the median voter will prefer a lower level of resources going into public institution building than will the average voter. By the median voter theorem, the median voter's preference decides the public policy. Hence, a rise in income inequality leads to a rise in the corruption level.
Example 3: Ethnic fragmentation.
This example is chosen because ethnic fragmentation has been a popular instrumental variable for corruption in regressions that examine the effects of corruption. 3 In our example, we show that there are no clear-cut predictions with regard to the effect of ethnic fragmentation.
In this example, people are different only in terms of their ethnic identity. For simplicity, let z(j) = 1 for all j. θ(j) differs with j's ethnic group membership. We can use the gap between θ(median) and θ(average) to measure the extent of ethnic fragmentation.
Case 1: There is a dominant ethnic group in the sense that the median (pivotal) voter belongs to this group. The dominant group engages in international trade/business more than other ethnic groups. In this case, θ (median) > θ (average). According to Proposition 2, item (iii), the median voter prefers a higher level of public governance than the mean voter. Hence, holding θ (average) constant, a greater divergence in preference along the ethnic line [or greater θ (median) -θ (average)] can lead to more resources devoted to public institutional building, and hence lower corruption.
Case 2: If the median voter is still in the dominant ethnic group. But the dominant group engages in less international trade than other groups. That is, θ (median) < θ (average). In this case, holding θ (average) constant, a greater divergence in preference along the ethnic line [or greater θ (average) -θ (median)] would lead to less resources devoted to public institutional building, and hence more corruption.
These two cases are not exhaustive of all possibilities. Hence, it is important to note that this example does not prove any solid prediction, but merely illustrates the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship between ethnic fragmentation and corruption.
Empirics
We now turn to empirical evidence on the c onnection between quality of government and natural openness. We look at two different dimensions of the quality of government: (a) a measure of an output of public governance, namely the level of bureaucratic corruption; and (b) a measure of an input into public governance, namely civil servant salaries relative to their private sector alternative.
We proceed in the following way. We first explain how "natural openness" is defined and constructed, but we leave a complete explanation of the source and definition of the other variables to a separate data appendix. We then investigate via a sequence of regressions. We use two separate measures of bureaucratic corruption, one from the early 1980s and the other from the late 1990s, respectively. We discuss our empirical tests for the two periods sequentially.
Measuring Natural Openness
We decompose the conventional measure of openness -exports plus imports, as percentage of GDP -into "natural openness" and "residual openness" by estimating what level of openness a country should have based on its size, geographic and linguistic characteristics. Specifically, we run the following regression:
We define the fitted value from such a regression as a measure of the country's 'natural openness,' and label the residual as "residual openness.' Such a regression resembles the empirically highly successful gravity equation in the trade literature except that its dependent variable is a country's trade-to-GDP ratio rather than bilateral trade. One can find a long list of empirical papers using the gravity equation. Recent applications include Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) and Rose (1999) . Frankel and Romer (1999) applied the gravity equation to construct an instrumented variable for openness, which is related to our "natural openness" measure. The theoretical foundation of the gravity equation has been provided by Helpman and Krugman (1985) , and Deardorff (1998), among others.
We construct "Remoteness" to capture how far a country is from the rest of the world. Intuitively, Argentina, being at the tip of South America, is farther away from the world market than is France, a country in the heart of the European continent. If other things were equal, France would naturally have a higher trade-to-GDP ratio than
Argentina. An empirical measure of "remoteness" was first constructed by Wei (1996) .
Here, we construct country k's remoteness as a weighted-average of its distance to all other countries in the world. We use each country's share of total trade in the world's total trade as the weights. For language abilities, we construct three dummies, "English," "French," and "Spanish," each of which takes the value of one if the country speaks the respective language, and zero otherwise. For other geographic characteristics, we construct a dummy, "landlock" if the country is landlocked; another dummy, "island" if the country is an island, and finally, the ratio of the length a country's sea coast to its land area, labeled as "coast-to-land area ratio."
We first explain the construction of "natural openness" in the late 1970s/early 1980s. Table 2a In Columns 2-4, we successively add the "landlock" dummy, the ratio of coastal length to land area, and the "island" dummy. When the "landlock" dummy is added by itself, its coefficient estimate is negative, consistent with the notion that landlocked countries trade less. The positive sign on the other two coefficients are consistent with the notions that a country with a longer coast is more open, and that an island economy is more open than otherwise. However, none of the coefficients on the three variables are statistically significantly from zero. So we cannot draw definitive conclusions here.
In Column 5, we add three dummies for the three major international languages, English, French and Spanish. The English dummy is positive and significant at the five percent level: English language ability facilitates international trade. The French and the Spanish dummies are not statistically significant. In Column 6, we report a regression that only includes the three regressors that are significant at the ten percent level or better (Remoteness, log Population, and English) in the previous columns.
In the subsequent empirical tests, we will use Column 5 in this table as the benchmark. We will define the fitted values from this regression as a measure of "natural openness" and label the residuals as "residual openness." As a robustness check, we construct measures of "natural openness" and "residual openness" based on the more parsimonious regression in Column 6. The results are sufficiently close that we will report only the first set of results.
For openness (log(total trade/GDP)) averaged over 1994-96, we perform a similar set of regressions. The results are reported in Table 2b . Because these results are sufficiently similar to those in Tables 2a, we omit discussing them to save space. In subsequent tests on openness and corruption in the late 1990s, we construct "natural openness" as the fitted values from the equation in Column 5 of Table 2b , and "residual openness" as the residuals from the same column. As a robustness check, we will also construct the same pair of natural and residual openness measures based on Column 6 of Table 2b .
Natural Openness and Corruption
We start with evidence from the early 1980s where corruption measure is the BIindex, averaged over 1980-83. Table 3 reports the basic regressions. In Column 1, when natural openness is entered by itself, its coefficient is negative and significant at the five percent level: naturally more open economies exhibit less corruption, exactly as our theoretical discussion has predicted. In Column 2, we add "residual openness," or the deviation of actual openness from the natural level. One possible reason for this deviation is government trade policies, which can cause the country to engage in more or less trade than its natural openness would have suggested. Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on the "residual openness" is not different from zero. In other words, the correlation between openness and corruption does not appear to go beyond what can be explained by geography, size and language abilities. Trade policies, in particular, appear to have played a relatively small role if at all in explaining corruption.
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In accordance with our theoretical discussion, richer countries tend to build better public institutions and display less corruption (and, outside our model, the reverse causality is also possible). In Column 3, we include per capital GDP as an additional control variable. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on this variable is negative and significant, confirming the notion that rich countries tend to have less corruption. Once per capital GDP is controlled for, the coefficient on natural openness drops substantially in absolute value (from -2.6 to -1.3). However it remains negative and significant. In other words, naturally more open economies have less corruption, and this relationship goes beyond the fact rich countries are both more open and less corrupt.
One remedy for corruption is democratic institutions. Democracy offers a mechanism to monitor the behavior of government officials more closely. One would expect that democracy helps to deter corruption. To check this, we include a measure of democracy as another control variable in Column 4. Unfortunately, democracy is not statistically different from zero (though it does have a negative coefficient). In Column 5, we add democracy by itself. Its coefficient is negative and significant: more democratic countries tend to have less corruption. However, the significance of the coefficient on democracy does not survive the addition of per capital GDP as a regressor. Hence, the democracy-corruption association merely reflects the fact that many rich countries are democracies and at the same time have less corruption.
In Table 4 , we consider a few more regressors that other authors have found to be important. First, we include "ethno-linguistic fractionalization," which measures the probability that two random persons from a country are not from the same ethnic group, and was first introduced into the economics literature by Mauro (1995) . Somewhat surprisingly, this measure is not statistically significant in our regressions.
[Some further probing indicates that if the ethno-linguistic fractionalization variable enters the regression by itself, it is positive and significant, exactly as in Mauro (1995) .
However, adding per capital GDP to the regression results in a loss of statistical significance and a switch in the coefficient's sign.]
Treisman (1998) argued that federal states produce more corruption than unitary states. We include his dummy variable for federal states in Column 3. Contrary to his findings, we find that federal states have a coefficient point estimate that is essentially zero. On the other hand, Fisman and Gatti (1999) used different measures of fiscal decentralization and found that more decentralized economies tend to have lower corruption. Their two measures of decentralization are either the share of the provincial and local governments in total government expenditure, or the share of the provincial and local governments in total government revenues. In the last two columns of Table 4 , we include the two Fisman-Gatti measures of fiscal decentralization. We confirm their finding that more decentralized economies do tend to have lower level of corruption as well. Here we do not want to get into the issue of direction of causality between federalism and corruption. Instead, we wish to emphasize that controlling for the degree of decentralization, the coefficient on "natural openness" continues to be negative and significant.
As a robustness check, we also use an alternative measure of corruption generated by a different organization (Transparency International, or TI) at a different time period (1998) . The TI also employed a different methodology from BI: it pools together surveys from a large number sources. 6 Using the TI corruption ratings, we replicate the key regressions in the earlier tables (with the regressors lagged by an appropriate period). The results are reported in Tables 5-6 . Broadly speaking, the results are qualitatively the same as before. First, the natural openness is always associated with less corruption. Second, residual openness is found to be insignificant throughout the tables. Third, high per capital GDP is associated with less corruption. Four, "democracy" does show up with a negative coefficient, consistent with the conventional wisdom. Fiscal decentralization as measured either by expenditure share or the revenue share of the local government in total governments' finance is also associated with less corruption. Weder reported fairly clear evidence that low public sector wages tend to be associated with high bureaucratic corruption.
Natural Openness and Public Sector Pay
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Because the public sector's relative salary is an input into the building of public governance rather than an output (such as corruption), it offers a good and separate channel to check our model's predictions regarding natural openness and quality of government. Table 7 reports the regression results on this question. In Column 1, we include "natural openness" as the only regressor. It has a positive and significant coefficient: a 10% increase in "natural openness" is associated with a 4% increase in the public sector salary relative to their private sector alternative. In Column 2, we add "residual openness." Both natural and residual openness have positive and significant coefficients. This suggests that, in addition to natural openness, other factors that promote openness, such as deliberate government policies, are also positively associated with the decision to pay civil servants better salaries. In Column 3, per capita GDP is added to the regression which has a positive coefficient: higher income countries on average choose to pay civil servants better. Controlling for the per capita income effect, both natural openness and residual openness continue to have a positive and significant effect on the public sector's relative salaries.
Conclusion
This paper offers a new interpretation of the connection between openness and quality of government. Countries are different in terms of their natural propensity to be open to international trade/business. Because foregone trade and business opportunities due to corruption and bad governance would be greater for naturally more open economies, they would choose to invest more in building good public governance and would display less corruption.
7 Rauch and Evans (1997) constructed their own index of public sector relative salaries based on an average of the answers to two survey questions by developing countries officials, one on the level of public salaries, and the other on the growth rate of the salaries. They failed to find a statistically significant relationship between their measure of relative public sector wage and corruption. However, decomposing the RauchEvans index back to their components (wage level and wage growth), Rauch and Evans (1997, Column 3 in their Table 1) found that there is still a negative and significant relationship between corruption and the level of public sector wage.
An extension of our model suggests that the incentive to invest in good public governance also increases with the average income level, and decreases with income equality. The effect of ethnic fragmentation is likely to be complex rather than simple.
The predictions of the model are examined with data from the early 1980s and from the late 1990s. Both an outcome indicator of public governance (the level of bureaucratic corruption) and an input indicator (public sector relative wage) are related to natural openness. Eight minus the sum of civil rights and political rights in 1983 and 1993. Converted so a higher figure indicates higher democracy.
Gini Coefficient for Income Distribution
Source: Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire, 1996, "A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality," Wold Bank Economic Review 10 (3): 565-591.
GINI is the abbreviation for Gini index. Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditures) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of zero represents perfect equality while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.
Source: same as GINI The income difference of top 20% and bottom 20%.
DISTRIB is the abbreviation for income share of bottom 40%. Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to subgroups of population indicated by quintiles. Percentage shares by quintiles may not add up to 100 because of rounding.
Federalism
A dummy that equals to one if country is a federal state and zero otherwise. Source: Treisman (1998) .
Fiscal Decentralization
Share of state or lower governments in the total government expenditure or revenue. Source: Fisman and Gatti (1999) . Courtesy of Roberta Gatti.
Government Wage / Manufacturing Sector Wage
Source: Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) . Courtesy of Caroline van Rijckeghem. 
